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The authors investigated social inference practices of Koreans
and Americans in two novel domains: behavioral predictions
and folk theories of behavior. When dispositional and situa-
tional inferences were disentangled, Koreans showed dispo-
sitional thinking to the same extent as Americans. This was the
case for behavioral predictions based on individual difference
information (Study 1) and for endorsements of a dispositionist
theory of behavior (Studies 1 and 3). Consistent with previous
research in the causal attribution and attitude attribution para-
digms, Koreans made greater situational inferences in behav-
ioral prediction as long as situational information was salient
(Study 2) and endorsed a situationist theory of behavior more
(Studies 1 and 3). Koreans also differed from Americans in
believing personality to be more malleable (Study 3).
Lay dispositionism (Ross & Nisbett, 1991) is a coherent
and powerful folk theory that promotes the attribution
of social behavior to enduring dispositions. Although
this folk theory is widespread in Western cultures, many
ethnographers, cross-cultural researchers, and cultural
psychologists have observed that in contrast to Western
cultures, the East Asian cultural area favors a situationist
folk psychology (e.g., Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, &
Nisbett, 1998). A growing body of research has revealed
that people in East and South Asia indeed explain behav-
ior more situationally than Americans do, in naturalistic
as well as experimental studies contrasting Americans
with Indians, Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese (Choi,
Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). Differences also have
been found in attitude attributions, comparing Ameri-
cans with Koreans (Choi & Nisbett, 1998) and Japanese
(Kitayama & Masuda, 2000) and Australians with Japa-
nese (Kashima, Siegel, Tanaka, & Kashima, 1992). Choi
et al. (1999) recently reviewed the evidence for cultural
differences in situational attributions.
Predicting Behavior
Everyday social judgment involves predicting the
behavior of other people as much as it involves explain-
ing their behavior or attitudes. In fact, attribution theo-
rists have always believed that people engage in causal
explanations of social events primarily to predict similar
events in the future (Heider, 1958; Jones, 1979). This is
apparent when, for example, one wonders if a friend will
like the movie recommended to her or when a military
leader trusts that an ally will support him in an upcoming
battle. Past research has shown that lay dispositionism is
as prevalent in prediction as it is in explanation. Ameri-
can participants overestimate the predictive power of
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dispositions just as they overattribute behavior to them
(Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990; Kunda &
Nisbett, 1986; Newman, 1996; Ross & Nisbett, 1991).
Surprisingly, however, most of the previous cross-cul-
tural work in social inference—as extensive as it is—has
focused primarily on explanations of behaviors and atti-
tudes. There has been little research examining behav-
ioral predictions across cultures. Given the centrality of
behavioral prediction in everyday life, an important
question is whether the cultural difference also is found
for predictions of behavior. More important, comparing
behavioral prediction across cultures provides one way
to specify the exact psychological source of the cultural
difference in social inference—whether it lies in
dispositional inference, situational inference, or in
both. In past cross-cultural work, it has been implicitly
assumed that social inference is a unitary process. Evi-
dence for strong situational attribution has been taken
to indicate weak dispositional attributions as well. But
the social inference process consists of at least two dis-
tinct cognitive operations: dispositional inference and
situational inference (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Krull,
1993). Dispositional inference is attributing behavior to
internal and enduring qualities of the individual, for
example, personality and temperament. Situational
inference is attributing behavior to external factors
impinging on the individual, such as situations, roles, or
the larger social context.
Specifying the Attributional Origins
of the Cultural Difference
There are two possibilities concerning how Western
and Eastern cultures might differ in behavioral predic-
tions. If Eastern cultures have weak beliefs in disposi-
tions, then their predictions about behavior should show
low levels of cross-situational consistency. The ethno-
graphic and cross-cultural literature certainly provides
some basis for this possibility. Anthropologists have occa-
sionally noted that dispositional thinking is rare, absent,
or unimportant in non-Western societies (Hirschfeld,
1995).
There is growing evidence, however, that even mem-
bers of Eastern cultures make robust dispositional infer-
ences (Choi et al., 1999). The second possibility for cul-
tural variation in behavioral prediction, then, is that
Eastern and Western cultures make dispositional infer-
ences in much the same way but differ in the degree to
which they make situational inferences. For example,
cross-cultural studies suggest that East Asians organize
personality information in remarkably similar ways as
Westerners, both with imported as well as indigenous
instruments (e.g., McCrae, Costa, & Yik, 1996; see Choi
et al., 1999). This evidence supports the case for East
Asian dispositionism to the extent that perceptions of
personality structure can be taken as evidence for mak-
ing dispositional inferences.
More direct social psychological evidence has
recently emerged that bolsters the argument that East-
erners and Westerners sometimes make dispositional
inferences in much the same way. Experimental work by
several researchers suggests that when situational con-
straints are not salient, East Asians, including Chinese,
Korean, and Japanese, show the correspondence bias at
least in one paradigm—the Jones and Harris (1967) atti-
tude attribution experiments (Choi & Nisbett, 1998;
Kitayama & Masuda, 2000; Krull et al., 1999). Of impor-
tance, some of these studies have found that the corre-
spondence bias for East Asians is reduced, or even elimi-
nated entirely, when the situational constraints are
salient. These same situational salience manipulations
have no effect on the correspondence bias shown by
Americans, suggesting that the cultural difference in
social inference may reflect primarily differences in situ-
ational inference. However, these studies were con-
ducted within a single paradigm—attitude attribution—
and therefore the question remains as to what extent
their findings would generalize to other social inference
practices, such as behavioral predictions and lay theories
of behavior.
Prediction Versus Explanation
To the extent that Eastern and Western cultures are
equally willing to infer dispositions from behavior but
differ in the degree to which they apply situational theo-
ries to behavior, different implications follow for cultural
variation in explanation versus prediction of behavior.
In prediction, the outcome of an actor’s behavior is not
known. As a result, using situational information to pre-
dict the behavior of a single individual is difficult
because it is unclear to an observer whether the situa-
tional influence under consideration applies to that par-
ticular individual. Will Tom act aggressively when pro-
voked by an adversary? Even if one believes that
provocation is a powerful trigger of violent behavior, not
everyone lashes out when provoked, and it is hard to pre-
dict in advance if Tom is the sort of person who reacts to
provocation. Thus, to the extent that individual differ-
ences are perceived in the same situation, the tendency
to use situational information is diminished (Ross &
Nisbett, 1991).
The uncertainty characteristic of prediction, how-
ever, is greatly reduced in the case of explanation
because knowledge of the behavioral outcome provides
clues as to whether the situational information applies to
the given individual, thus diminishing concerns about
individual differences in the same situation. People then
can easily apply situational information to the extent
that they endorse a situationist theory of behavior. After
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learning that Tom did react violently, one who believes in
the power of provocation can conclude with reasonable
certainty that provocation led to his aggression. This
analysis suggests that cultural variation that readily
emerges in explanation may be reduced or even elimi-
nated in prediction, unless salient situational informa-
tion is available.
To recap, a significant body of evidence has estab-
lished that there is a cultural difference in situational
inference between Western and Eastern cultures,
reviewed recently by Choi et al. (1999) (see also
Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 1999). This evidence, how-
ever, has been largely limited to two research paradigms:
attitude attribution and causal attribution. There is also
suggestive evidence that under some circumstances East-
erners display dispositional inference as much as West-
erners. However, most of the past research has not exam-
ined the distinct contributions of these two processes—
dispositional and situational—to the cultural difference.
The present research therefore had three goals. First,
we broadened the scope of the cross-cultural evidence by
examining social inference in two novel research para-
digms previously overlooked: behavioral prediction and
folk theories of social behavior. Second, these two novel
paradigms allowed us to assess the relative contributions
of dispositional and situational inference to the cultural
difference. Third, we explored the possibility that the
East Asian folk theory of personality may be qualitatively
different from the Western form in that it may reflect the
belief that dispositions are situationally malleable.
We examined (a) the degree to which Koreans, com-
pared to Americans, would rely on individual difference
information to predict future behavior when situational
information is minimal (Study 1); (b) the effects of situa-
tional information of varying salience on Korean and
American predictions of the cross-situational consis-
tency of behavior (Study 2); and (c) endorsement of
dispositionist, situationist, and interactionist theories of
behavior as well as beliefs in the malleability of personal-
ity (Studies 1 and 3). Because no gender differences
were found in these studies, the results are presented
without reference to gender.
STUDY 1
Overview
Study 1 had two goals. First, we wanted to answer three
specific questions about disposition-based prediction in
the absence of situational information. To what extent
would East Asians, as compared to Americans, (a) rely on
abstract trait information to make predictions about
future behavior and (b) rely on information in the form
of concrete behaviors—without mention of trait labels—
in predicting future behavior (suggesting inference of
traits from concrete behavior). We also wanted to investi-
gate the possibility of any cross-cultural differences in
the strength of predictions as a function of aggregation
of behavioral information, that is, sensitivity to the law of
large numbers in social inference.
The second goal of this study was to examine East-
West cultural differences in situational and dispositional
attributions using an alternative strategy: We directly
measured participants’ explicit endorsement of these
lay theories of social behavior. We expected that Koreans
would be more willing than Americans to endorse
situationism and interactionism but that the two cultural
groups would be equally willing to endorse dispositionism.
In the first part of the study, we gave participants sce-
narios; in each, there were two target individuals, and
one of them always acted in a trait-consistent manner
more than did the other individual, for example, Person A
was more helpful than Person B. Participants were asked
to predict the extent to which they believed Person A
also would behave in a more helpful manner than Per-
son B in a future instance. A total of six traits/behaviors
were used: positively valenced (helpful, friendly), nega-
tively valenced (aggressive, dishonest), and relatively
valence-neutral (talkative, punctual). In the second part,
participants read three arguments representing situa-
tionism, dispositionism, and interactionism and indi-
cated their agreement with each argument.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants included 100 Korean students at Yonsei
University, Korea (51 men, 49 women, age M = 20.7), and
97 European American students at the University of
Michigan (34 men, 63 women, age M = 19) who partici-
pated in the study for introductory psychology class
credit.
MATERIALS
The first page of the questionnaire included instruc-
tions followed by a rating scale and the six behavioral sce-
narios. For Korean participants, all materials were trans-
lated into Korean using the back-translation method
(Brislin, 1970). Each of the six behavioral scenarios con-
sisted of a short paragraph about Person A, who was
observed to act in a manner reflecting a trait more than
Person B in a given situation. Participants were asked to
predict to what extent they believed that in a future, simi-
lar situation, A also would act in the trait-consistent way
more than B. For the trait condition, participants read
the following:
Suppose you observed a number of people in a number
of situations that could reflect their degree of (helpful-
ness). And suppose you observed A and B in one such sit-
uation, and A was more (helpful) than B. What do you
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suppose is the probability that if you observed A and B
again, you would also find A to be more (helpful) than B?
The rating scale was adopted from Kunda and Nisbett
(1986). Participants were asked to indicate any number
ranging from 100% to 50%, with higher numbers indi-
cating greater confidence in the stability of individual
differences.1They read the following scale information:
If you thought Person A would almost certainly be more
(helpful) than Person B, you should say 95% or higher. If
you thought there was a good chance that Person A
would be more (helpful) than Person B, you should say
70% to 80%. If you thought there was only a moderate
chance, you should say 60% to 70%. And if you thought
you couldn’t tell whether or not Person A would be
more (helpful) than Person B, you should say 50%-50%—
Person A is equally likely to be more or less (helpful)
than Person B.1
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
The design was 2 (cultural group: American vs.
Korean)× 3 (behavioral information: concrete behavior,
trait, total trait) × 3 (trait valence, within-groups: posi-
tive, neutral, negative). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the three behavioral information
conditions.
Concrete behavior condition. Participants received indi-
vidual difference information in the form of concrete
behaviors, tapping a trait, but without labeling the
behaviors in terms of a trait. An effort was made by Amer-
ican and Korean informants to construct functionally
equivalent items. As an example, the concrete behavior
scenario reflecting “helpful” was as follows:
Suppose you observed two people, A and B, being asked
to participate in a blood donation drive and saw that A
volunteers to work more hours than B collecting blood.
What do you suppose is the probability that, being
approached by a homeless person asking for money to
buy food, A gives more money to the homeless person
than B?
Trait condition. Participants received the individual
difference information in the form of a trait, such as
helpful, dishonest, talkative, and so forth.
Total trait condition. This was identical to the trait con-
dition except that instead of predicting from one single
instance to another single instance, participants pre-
dicted from the average of 20 instances to the average of
another 20 instances. This allowed us to assess sensitivity
to the law of large numbers in social prediction.
After making all six predictions, participants read
three arguments that had been carefully prepared to
reflect three views of social behavior: dispositionism,
situationism, and interactionism. They were asked to
express their opinion about each argument on a 9-point
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). The
argument for dispositionism emphasized the consis-
tency and stability of personality and the power of per-
sonality in explaining and predicting behavior. In con-
trast, the argument for situationism stressed the
weakness of personality in determining behavior and
focused on the power of the situation. The argument for
interactionism defended both dispositionism and
situationism and highlighted the complex interaction of




Each participant’s prediction estimates for the six sce-
narios were averaged to serve as the dependent variable
(α = .70). The results can be seen in Table 1. A Culture
× Behavioral Information × Valence (within-groups)
mixed ANOVA was conducted on the dependent vari-
able. There was no main effect of culture, F < 1. Thus,
Americans and Koreans made the same degree of pre-
dictions overall. There was a Culture × Behavioral Infor-
mation interaction, F(2, 191) = 3.94, p < . 02, such that in
the trait condition, Korean predictions were stronger
than American predictions, t(64) = 2.26, p < .05, whereas
the reverse was the case in the total trait condition, t(66) =
2.18, p < .05. No cultural differences emerged in the con-
crete behavior condition, t < 1. American predictions
showed sensitivity to aggregation contrasting the trait
condition with the total trait condition, t(65) = 3.80, p <
.005, whereas no such sensitivity was evident for Koreans,
t < 1. Neither culture was affected by the trait label
manipulation, because there were no differences
between the trait condition and the concrete behavior
condition, F < 1, for either contrast.
The results also revealed a main effect of valence, F(1,
191) = 11.93, p < .005, such that negative traits received
higher predictions than neutral and positive traits. How-
ever, this main effect was qualified by culture, F(1, 191) =
11.97, p < .005. Subsequent analyses indicated that this
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TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Be-
havioral Predictions by Culture and Type of Prediction
(Study 1)
Behavioral Information
Concrete Behavior Trait Total Trait
Cultural Group M M M
American (n = 97) 71.53 (11.35) 70.07 (9.53) 77.91 (7.23)
Korean (n = 100) 72.67 (10.66) 75.06 (8.32) 74.04 (7.41)
NOTE: The six behaviors/traits were helpful, friendly (positive), talk-
ative, punctual (neutral), aggressive, and dishonest (negative).
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pattern did not hold for Korean participants. Whereas
Americans reliably gave higher estimates for negative
traits than for positive traits, t(96) = 4.77, p < .001, and
neutral traits, t(96) = 2.74, p < .01, Koreans did not agree
with Americans that negative traits are the most cross-
situationally stable. Indeed, Korean predictions for neg-
ative and positive traits did not differ, t < 1, although they
did agree with Americans that positive traits are less sta-
ble than neutral traits, t(96) = 2.81, p < .01.
FOLK THEORIES OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
For the argument supporting dispositionism, there
was no cultural difference; M = 5.00, SD = 1.58 for Ameri-
cans, and M = 5.19, SD = 1.62 for Koreans, F < 1. In con-
trast to dispositionism, Koreans endorsed situationism
more than did Americans, M = 5. 91, SD = 1.42, and M =
5.43, SD = 1.81, respectively, F(1, 191) = 4.44, p < .05.
However, there were no cultural differences for the argu-
ment representing interactionism, M = 7.95, SD = 1.40
for Americans, and M = 7.79, SD = 1.37 for Koreans, F < 1.
Interestingly, endorsements of the two arguments sup-
porting dispositionism and situationism were unrelated
for both Americans, r(n = 97) = .05, p = ns, and Koreans,
r(n = 100) = .15, p = ns.
Discussion
Koreans made predictions as strong as those made by
Americans. Presenting the behavioral information in
terms of concrete behaviors versus in terms of traits
did not change the estimates of Americans or Koreans.
This data pattern indicates that in the absence of situa-
tional information, Koreans, and perhaps other East
Asians as well, can be as likely as Americans to see high
cross-situational consistency in social behavior.2
In addition, Americans, but not Koreans, showed sen-
sitivity to aggregation of behavior. As to the valence of
traits, cultural similarities as well as differences emerged
in the way valence affected future predictions. Both cul-
tural samples agreed that positive traits are less stable
than (less positive) neutral traits. However, only Ameri-
cans thought that positive traits are less stable than nega-
tive traits, a result consistent with past research (Gidron,
Koehler, & Tversky, 1993).
Moving on to lay theories of social behavior, Ameri-
cans and Koreans endorsed dispositionism equally,
whereas Koreans agreed with situationism more than
did the Americans. These data reinforce the findings for
predictions of behavior, indicating that East Asians and
Westerners are equally willing to see social behavior
through the lens of dispositions when situational infor-
mation is unavailable or nonsalient. The data also show
that the two cultures differ reliably in the extent to which
situational causes of behavior are highlighted. Finally, it
is interesting to note that no cultural differences were
found in participants’ agreement with the interactionist
argument. This is despite evidence that East Asian cul-
tures endorse a contextualist folk psychology, such that
behavior is seen as the outcome of complex interactions
between the person and the situation (Choi et al., 1999).
It is also interesting to note that of the three arguments,
the interactionist argument drew the highest agreement
ratings on the part of all participants. Thus, both West-
erners and Easterners seem to be strong believers in an
interactionist view of social behavior.
STUDY 2
Study 1 demonstrated that Koreans think as disposi-
tionally as Americans in the absence of situational infor-
mation. These findings support the possibility that the
East-West cultural difference in social inference is not to
be found in sheer tendency to apply dispositional con-
structs. The difference thus is more likely to be due to
differential sensitivity to salient situational constraints.
There are at least two contexts under which this cultural
difference could emerge in social prediction.
One possible condition is to have participants make
aggregate predictions rather than singular predictions.
Aggregate prediction involves predicting the behaviors
of a group of people in a given situation rather than the
behavior of a single individual in a given situation (e.g.,
How likely is it that a group of people will be talkative at a
party?). In making an aggregate prediction, participants
cannot use a dispositional theory of behavior; they have
to rely exclusively on their situational theories to make a
meaningful prediction. If the source of the East-West cul-
tural difference lies in situationism, then a cultural dif-
ference should emerge in aggregate prediction.
A second context in which a cultural difference in
situationism should lead to a cultural difference in pre-
dicting social behavior is when the situational informa-
tion is so strong and attention drawing that participants
would be compelled to rely on it at least partly despite
the availability of conflicting dispositional information.
Tom may have been quiet at last month’s party but if we
learn that at the next party all the guests know and like
each other quite well, and you bring it to our attention
that most people in this situation become talkative, then
it should be hard to ignore this information in our pre-
diction of Tom’s behavior. We would expect East Asians
to be more likely to apply situational information that is
brought to their attention.
In Study 2, therefore, we wanted to achieve three
things: First, we measured participants’ aggregate pre-
dictions—or base rate estimates—in addition to single-
case predictions. Second, participants received strong
situational information in addition to dispositional
information. Third, we examined the extent to which
making the situational information salient—explicitly
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drawing the participants’ attention to the situational
information—would make them more likely to use that
information in behavioral prediction. We examined
whether Koreans were more influenced by behavioral
base rates in making single-case predictions than
Americans.
The situational information was manipulated by ask-
ing participants to make behavioral predictions based
on information either about a facilitating situation,
which made the trait-consistent behavior more likely to
occur (e.g., a talkative individual being in a party), or
based on an inhibiting situation, which made the trait-
consistent behavior less likely to occur (e.g., a talkative
individual being at a church service).
We used a priming manipulation to enhance the
salience of situational information. Unlike participants
in the nonsalient base rate condition, those in the salient
base rate condition were asked to make aggregate pre-
dictions before answering the single-case prediction
questions. We anticipated that answering aggregate pre-
dictions (e.g., How many people, out of 100, would do
this behavior in this particular situation?) before making
predictions about the behavior of a single individual
would draw participants’ attention to the importance of
the situation in influencing the behavior of the target in
the single-case prediction task. Thus, the measurement
of one dependent variable (the aggregate prediction
task) also served as a salience manipulation for the other
dependent variable (the single-case prediction task).
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Study 2 consisted of 58 individuals: 32 students
recently arrived from Korea who were learning English
at the University of Michigan for the summer period
(17 men, 15 women, age M = 22) and 26 American stu-
dents (25EuropeanAmerican,1AfricanAmerican;11men,
15 women, age M = 21) recruited from among under-
graduates at the university. All participants were paid $10
for their participation in the study.
INSTRUCTIONS
Participants received a six-page questionnaire. For
Korean participants, the questionnaire was translated
and back-translated (Brislin, 1970) by two bilingual
Korean graduate students. In the Korean version of the
questionnaire, we used common Korean names to
replace the English names and Korean equivalents of
American cultural items. As in the previous studies, par-
ticipants were asked to make predictions about the
future behavior of a target individual using the same six
behavioral scenarios. Unlike the previous study, how-
ever, participants were asked only about one actor who
behaved in a trait-consistent manner.3
SITUATIONAL INFORMATION MANIPULATION
Half of the participants received situational informa-
tion that would facilitate the behavior and the other half
received situational information that would inhibit the
behavior. The following is the scenario for “helpful” in
the inhibiting condition:
You just met a new neighbor, Jim. As you and Jim are tak-
ing a walk in the neighborhood, a well-dressed man
approaches Jim and explains that his car is broken down
and he needs to call a mechanic. Then with a somewhat
embarrassed voice the man asks Jim for a quarter to
make the phone call. You find that Jim searches his
pocket and after finding a quarter gives it to the man. On
another day Jim is walking toward the bus stop to catch
the bus to work. As he is walking, a teenager carrying
some books approaches Jim and politely asks him if he
can borrow a dollar for a bus ride, explaining that he for-
got his wallet at home and needs to get a ride to school.
Jim searches his pocket and discovers that he only has
one dollar with him. He realizes that if he gives the dollar
to the teenager, he will not be able to ride the bus himself
and will miss an important business meeting. Do you
think Jim will give the dollar to the teenager?
As can be seen in the example above, the dispositional
information was given in the first paragraph in the form
of a behavior (giving a quarter for a phone call) implying
a trait (helpful). The second part of the scenario intro-
duces the situational information, in this case inhibiting
information (being helpful would mean missing an
important business meeting for the actor).
The facilitating condition was identical to the inhibit-
ing one except that in the second part participants
received facilitating information. Thus, instead of hav-
ing only one dollar in his pocket, Jim “searches his
pocket and discovers that he has several dollars with him,
enough money to pay for his bus ride and for the teen-
ager’s.” Furthermore, there was no mention of an impor-
tant business meeting in the facilitating scenario.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
For single-case predictions, participants read the fol-
lowing in the instructions:
Your answer can be any number between 0 and 100. Zero
indicates that you are absolutely certain that the person
will not do the behavior in the future. One hundred indi-
cates that you are absolutely certain that the person will
do that behavior in the future.
For the aggregate prediction task, participants were
instructed to estimate what proportion of 100 randomly
selected individuals would do each behavior in the situa-
tion being described. The aggregate prediction scenar-
ios were identical to the single-case prediction scenarios
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except that the dispositional information was removed:
Participants read only the second part of the prediction
scenarios containing the situational information (inhib-
iting vs. facilitating). Thus, participants in the salient
base rate condition first made aggregate predictions
(i.e., generated base rate estimates) for each situation,
then read the dispositional and situational information
about a single target person, and then predicted the tar-
get’s behavior. Participants in the nonsalient base rate
condition first read dispositional and situational infor-
mation about the target, predicted the target’s future
behavior, and then proceeded to make aggregate
predictions.
DESIGN OF STUDY
The design was 2 (cultural group: American vs.
Korean) × 2 (situational information: facilitating vs.
inhibiting) × 2 (salience: aggregate predictions before
vs. after single-case predictions), all between-subjects
conditions.
Results
Aggregate predictions and singular predictions were
averaged across the six scenarios to produce a single
average aggregate prediction score and a single average
single-case prediction score for each participant, with
respective internal reliability coefficients of α = .83 and
α = .88.
AGGREGATE PREDICTIONS
Figure 1 shows the aggregate predictions. A 2 (cul-
tural group: American vs. Korean) × 2 (situational infor-
mation: facilitating vs. inhibiting) × 2 (aggregate predic-
tions before vs. after single-case predictions) between-
subjects ANOVA on aggregate predictions revealed a
large main effect of situational information, such that
inhibiting situations received lower aggregate predic-
tions compared to facilitating situations, F(1, 50) =
408.40, p < .001. As expected, a Culture × Situational
Information interaction emerged, such that Korean
aggregate predictions were more responsive to the situa-
tional information than American predictions, F(1, 50) =
7.71, p < .01; Korean predictions were higher when the
situation was facilitating and lower when the situation
was inhibiting.
SINGLE-CASE PREDICTIONS
Figure 2 shows the single-case predictions for each
cultural group. A Culture (American vs. Korean) × Situa-
tional Information (facilitating vs. inhibiting) × Salience
(salient base rate vs. nonsalient base rate) ANOVA con-
ducted on the single-case predictions again revealed a
large main effect of situational information, with inhibit-
ing scenarios receiving lower prediction estimates com-
pared to facilitating scenarios, F(1, 50) = 256.46, p < .001,
M = 30.08 and M = 78.07. Also, a Situational Information
× Salience interaction was observed, F(1, 50) = 10.93, p <
.005. However, this two-way interaction will not be dis-
cussed further because a three-way interaction between
culture, situational information, and salience of situa-
tional information emerged, F(1, 50) = 4.60, p < .05. This
finding indicates that Koreans were more likely than
Americans to apply situational information to predict
the behavior of the target individual, but only when the
situational information was made salient by having par-
ticipants make aggregate predictions before making
single-case predictions. There were no differences
between American and Korean predictions when base
rate predictions came after.
The cultural difference in sensitivity to situational
constraints is especially apparent when the situational
salience manipulation is considered for each cultural
group. For Koreans, single-case predictions in the salient
base rate condition were more responsive to the base
rates than the predictions in the nonsalient base rate
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Figure 1 Mean aggregate predictions for each cultural group and
type of situational information (facilitating vs. inhibiting)
averaged across six behaviors.
NOTE: Means indicate the estimated number of people out of a ran-
domly selected 100 who would engage in the behavior specified in each
scenario (Study 2).
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condition, t(50) = 3.50, p < .005, for facilitating situa-
tions, and t(50) = 2.01, p < .05, for inhibiting situations.
In contrast, American predictions were not affected at all
by the salience manipulation, t < 1, for both facilitating
and inhibiting situations.
CULTURAL DIFFERENCE IN SINGLE-CASE
PREDICTION OR IN CONVERSATIONAL LOGIC?
We now consider an alternative conversational logic
or experimental demand interpretation for the cultural
difference in the single-case predictions. Asking people
to make aggregate predictions before making single-
case judgments may have created a conversational
implicature, or an experimental demand, to use the out-
come of the prior judgment in the subsequent one.
Moreover, if Easterners are more attuned to social cues
from other people, they might be especially sensitive to
informational cues provided by the researcher.
Despite the plausibility of this argument, there is no
reported evidence indicating that Easterners are actually
more responsive to experimental cues than are West-
erners. In fact, there is some evidence that Easterners
can be less responsive to experimental instructions than
Westerners (e.g., Choi & Nisbett, 1998, Study 2). Never-
theless, if Easterners were more sensitive to experimen-
tal cues in this study, they would be expected to use the
base rate information in the subsequent single-case pre-
dictions more than Westerners.
According to this interpretation, then, Koreans may
have been more compelled to use any prior information
that preceded a task, rather than being more compelled
to apply situational information per se. This alternative
interpretation can be tested in the condition when the
single-case judgment preceded the aggregate judgment.
This interpretation predicts that Koreans should have
been more compelled to apply the dispositional infor-
mation (contained in the single-case prediction task;
e.g., a helpful behavior) to the subsequent aggregate
judgment. That is, Koreans should have used the individ-
ual helpful act (in single-case prediction) more to esti-
mate higher rates of helpfulness by a group of 100 indi-
viduals (in aggregate prediction), for both the facilitating
and inhibiting scenarios.
However, this was not the case. There was no main
effect of order of the two tasks on aggregate predictions,
F(1, 50) = 1.40, p = ns, and most important, no two-way
interaction between culture and order, F(1, 50) = 1.12,
p = ns, or a three-way interaction between culture, type of
situational information, and order, F < 1. Exposure to the
dispositional information in the single-case prediction
task affected neither Americans’ nor Koreans’ subse-
quent aggregate predictions. Thus, there is some evi-
dence that the Koreans’ greater use of self-generated
base rates in single-case prediction was not due to a gen-
eral tendency to make greater use of any preceding
information presented by the experimenter. Rather, it
was due to a greater Korean tendency to use specifically
situational information in social judgment.
Discussion
The main effect of situational information on aggre-
gate predictions as well as on single-case predictions
indicates that both American and Korean participants
can be sensitive to sharp variations in situational infor-
mation. The interesting finding, however, is that Korean
aggregate predictions were more sensitive to base rates
than those of Americans.
As for the single-case predictions, when dispositional
theories were countered by salient situational informa-
tion, Korean participants were more likely than Ameri-
cans to apply their situationist beliefs in predicting social
behavior. Furthermore, increasing the salience of situa-
tional base rates influenced Korean predictions in the
expected manner but had no effect on American predic-
tions. This pattern reinforces findings obtained by Choi
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Figure 2 Mean single-case predictions for each cultural group, type
of situational information (facilitating vs. inhibiting), and
salience of situational information averaged across all six
behaviors.
NOTE: Higher numbers indicate stronger predictions for future be-
havior (Study 2).
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and Nisbett (1998) and Kitayama and Masuda (2000) in
the Jones and Harris (1967) attitude attribution para-
digm. When situational constraints were made salient to
the participants, Koreans and Japanese corrected their
correspondent inferences. The same situational salience
manipulation had no effect on American attributions
(Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Snyder & Jones, 1974; but see
Newman & Ruble, 1992, for evidence that American chil-
dren correct their correspondence inferences when situ-
ational constraints are salient).
STUDY 3
Study 3 was conducted to replicate and further
extend the findings of Study 1. Participants read again
the three arguments of Study 1 and expressed their
degree of agreement with them. Furthermore, we exam-
ined the possibility that the nature of the dispositional
theories held by the two cultures is different, even if East-
erners and Westerners are both likely to engage in
dispositional inference. The coexistence of situationism
and dispositionism in Eastern folk psychology should
lead Easterners to have theories indicating that disposi-
tions are more malleable and more likely to incorporate
situational variability than are theories of Westerners.
Thus, Western dispositionism might be analogous to
what Dweck and her colleagues call “entity theory,”
whereas East Asian dispositionism may be more like
“incremental theory” (Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993).
Both theories are about dispositions, but they differ
regarding their malleability. Entity theorists believe that
dispositions such as personality, intelligence, and moral
character are fixed and that people cannot change them
at will. In contrast, incremental theorists believe that dis-
positions are flexible and malleable. Dweck and her col-
leagues demonstrate that social judgment differs
depending on the implicit theory a person has.
Compared to entity theorists, incremental theorists
make trait inferences that are more specific (in that they
do not endorse global traits), more provisional (in that
they are responsive to contradictory information), and
more conditional (in that they expect change with
changed circumstances).
To explore the possibility that East Asians are indeed
more like incremental theorists, whereas Americans are
more like entity theorists, Study 3 measured implicit the-
ory of personality (entity vs. incremental theory). In
addition, we measured endorsement of lay theories of
social behavior. We expected no difference in disposi-
tionist theory of behavior and a cultural divergence in




Korean students at So-Gang University in Korea (N =
120) and American students at the University of Michi-
gan (N = 121) took part in the study for introductory psy-
chology class credit.
PROCEDURE
For Korean participants, all materials were translated
into Korean using the back-translation method (Brislin,
1970). Participants were given a booklet containing the
same three arguments of Study 3 reflecting disposi-
tionism, situationism, and interactionism (see Table 1).
They were asked to express their opinion about each
argument on a 9-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9
(strongly agree).
Participants then read four statements devised by
Erdley and Dweck (1993) intended to measure implicit
theory of personality. They were asked to express their
agreement with each statement on a 6-point scale from 1
(strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree). The four statements
can be seen in Table 2. Because incremental theory of
personality elicits socially desirable responding,
endorsement of an incremental view of personality is
measured in terms of disagreement with statements that
reflect an entity theory of personality (Chiu, Hong, &
Dweck, 1997). Extensive research supports the validity of
this strategy. For example, when asked to justify their
responses, people who disagree with entity theory pro-
vide explanations that are consistent with an incremen-
tal view of personality, and participants who are experi-
mentally induced to think in a manner consistent with
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TABLE 2: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Dis-
agreement With Statements Representing Entity Theory
of Personality (Study 3)
American Korean p
Someone’s personality is
something about them that
they can’t change very much. 3.50 (1.27) 4.04 (1.28) < .001
A person can do things to get
people to like them but they
can’t change their real
personality. 3.09 (1.30) 3.79 (1.37) < .001
Everyone has a certain personality
and it is something that they
can’t do much about. 3.41 (1.28) 3.99 (1.31) < .001
A person can change the way
they act but they can’t change
their real personality. 3.09 (1.32) 3.63 (1.41) < .005
NOTE: Higher numbers indicate stronger disagreement with entity
theory of personality on a 6-point scale.
 at UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN on June 29, 2012psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
incremental theory exhibit behavior that is similar to
those participants who disagree with entity statements
(see Chiu et al., 1997, for a review of the literature vali-
dating the measurement of incremental theory in terms
of disagreement with entity theory). Thus, greater dis-
agreement with these “entity” statements indicates
greater endorsement of incremental theory of personal-
ity, although incremental theory is not measured directly
in this study.
Results
FOLK THEORIES OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
For the argument supporting dispositionism, there
was no cultural difference; M = 4.59, SD = 1.79 for Ameri-
cans, and M = 4.82, SD = 1.79 for Koreans, F < 1. However,
Korean participants agreed with the argument repre-
senting situationism more than American participants
did, M = 5.27, SD = 1.46, and M = 4.67, SD = 1.62, respec-
tively, F(1, 240) = 8.47, p < .005. Unlike in Study 3, the
same cultural difference this time emerged also for the
argument representing interactionism, M = 7.32, SD =
2.01 for Americans, and M = 7.99, SD = .98 for Koreans,
F(1, 240) = 10.63, p < .001.
FOLK THEORIES OF PERSONALITY
We averaged participants’ ratings of the four argu-
ments and compared the two cultures (α = .91 and .92
for Americans and Koreans, respectively). As expected,
Koreans disagreed with entity theory more than Ameri-
cans did (M = 3.87, SD = 1.21 for Koreans, and M = 3.27,
SD = 1.14 for Americans), F(1, 240) = 15.60, p < .001.
Indeed, as can be seen in Table 2, Koreans disagreed
with all four statements more than Americans did.
Discussion
The data on lay theory of social behavior in this study
support our findings in the previous studies: East Asians
and Westerners differed reliably in situationism but not
in dispositionism. We also found that East Asians
endorsed interactionism more than Americans did.
This, we believe, is also a reflection of East Asians’
greater sensitivity to situational influence. Thus, partici-
pants’ theory of social behavior converges on the behav-
ioral prediction data reported in Study 1. Interestingly,
the interactionist argument again drew the highest rate
of endorsement, indicating that it is the theory that both
cultures endorse the most.
The findings on lay theory of personality indicate that
personality theories in East and West differ in an impor-
tant way: Easterners believe in the malleability of disposi-
tions more than Americans do. Thus, Korean partici-
pants’ thinking was more like that of incremental
theorists of personality, whereas American participants’
thinking was more like that of entity theorists.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Study 1 showed that when situational information was
absent, Koreans and Americans drew the same
dispositional inferences about an actor’s behavior and
thus predicted equally high behavioral consistency
across situations. In Study 2, Koreans made predictions
about aggregate behavior that were more influenced by
situational information than those of Americans. Also,
when predicting the behavior of a single individual,
highly accessible situational information affected
Korean but not American predictions. Finally, whereas
Koreans and Americans were equally likely to endorse a
dispositionist theory of behavior, Koreans agreed with a
situationist theory more (Studies 1 and 3).
The present research indicates that cultural differ-
ences in social inference are not confined to causal
explanation and attitude attribution but operate for pre-
dictions of behavior and lay theories of behavior as well.
Thus, cultural differences in social inference permeate a
broad range of inferential practices. However, cultural
variation in social inference is context sensitive. It is
robust under conditions when situational information is
highly accessible and decreases and may disappear
entirely to the extent that situational information is rela-
tively difficult to apply.
Even though East Asians are willing to infer disposi-
tions from behavior as much as Westerners, Eastern and
Western dispositionism are not qualitatively identical.
Easterners believe in the continuous shaping of person-
ality traits by situational influences. This Eastern belief in
the alterability of personality traits parallels the distinc-
tion between people who subscribe to entity theory ver-
sus incremental theory of personality (e.g., Dweck et al.,
1993). We provided preliminary evidence that Western
dispositionism is like entity theory, in that it reflects the
belief that personality traits are fixed. In contrast, East-
ern dispositionism is more like incremental theory, in
that it reflects the belief that personality traits are mallea-
ble (Study 3).
Lay Dispositionism as Psychological Essentialism
Why should lay dispositionism be more resistant to
cross-cultural variation than previously anticipated? A
possible theoretical explanation may be that lay
dispositionism is a form of psychological essentialism, a
mode of thinking that consists of attributing a hidden
essence or quality to a thing, which causes its observable
as well as hidden properties (Atran, 1990; Gelman, 1992;
Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). Essentialism has been
observed in a number of diverse domains, notably in rea-
soning about animals and social groups in a large variety
of cultures (Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). Gelman
(1992) observes that folk biological and dispositional
thinking are strikingly similar, raising the possibility that
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dispositionism is essentialism in the domain of folk psy-
chology. Just as the “biological essence” of a zebra causes
it to develop a striped fur and act like a zebra, an individ-
ual’s personality, or “psychological essence,” causes a
person to think, feel, and behave in particular ways.
It is likely that both Easterners and Westerners
essentialize personality relative to other domains that do
not support essentialistic reasoning, such as artifacts.
Future research can establish the relative strength of
essentialism in personality theories across cultures. Our
data, indicating that Easterners view personality as more
malleable than Westerners, suggests the possibility that
cultures that endorse situationism may be less likely to
essentialize personality.
Cultural Variation in Social Inference
The evidence we presented suggests that what varies
across cultures is the situational inference part of the
attribution process, whereas dispositional inference is
less susceptible to cultural variation. Our studies support
other cross-cultural investigations, which have reported
a similar pattern of findings. For example, in a Korean
replication of the classic McArthur (1972) study, Cha
and Nam (1985) found that Korean attributions relied
substantially on consensus information, indicating
greater East Asian sensitivity to situational information.
However, Koreans did not differ from Americans in
response to distinctiveness and consistency information.
Thus, Koreans were as likely as Americans to use
dispositional information.
Because East Asians are willing to apply their person-
ality theories in social judgment when the situational
information is absent or nonobvious, they can be as
prone to the correspondence bias as Americans. This has
been illustrated in recent cross-cultural replications of
the correspondence bias in Jones and Harris’s (1967)
attitude attribution paradigm for Koreans (Choi &
Nisbett, 1998), Japanese (Kitayama & Masuda, 2000),
and Chinese (Krull et al., 1999). However, when Choi
and Nisbett (1998) and Kitayama and Masuda (2000)
made the situational constraints obvious to the partici-
pants, both Koreans and Japanese showed very little cor-
respondence bias. The same manipulation had no effect
on the correspondence bias for American samples (Choi &
Nisbett, 1998; Snyder & Jones, 1974).
Finally, identifying the attributional source and
boundary conditions of the cultural variation in social
inference has implications for the psychology of cultural
misunderstandings. The evidence suggests that when sit-
uational information about the other is absent, both cul-
tures will attribute behavior to its corresponding disposi-
tion; thus, no cultural misunderstanding will occur that
reflects attributional differences. But when salient situa-
tional information is available to observers, cultural mis-
understanding can emerge. In such situations, East
Asians will be attuned to situational information to a
greater extent than Westerners and will be more likely to
attribute the other’s behavior to situational constraints.
Research that illuminates these processes can tell us
much about the social psychological roots of intercultural
misunderstandings.
APPENDIX
Lay Theories of Social Behavior
Presented to Participants (Studies 1 and 3)
Dispositionism
How people behave is mostly determined by their personal-
ity. One’s personality predisposes and guides an individual to
behave in one way, not in another way, no matter what circum-
stances the person is in. In a sense, behavior is an unfolding of
personality. One’s behavior is remarkably stable across time
and consistent across situations because it is guided by person-
ality. Therefore, if we know the personality of one person, we
can easily predict how the person will behave in the future and
explain why that person behaved in the particular way in the
past.
Situationism
How people behave is mostly determined by the situation in
which they find themselves. Situational power is so strong that
we can say it has more influence on behavior than one’s person-
ality. Often, people in a particular situation behave very simi-
larly, despite large individual differences in personality.
Therefore, in order to predict and explain one’s behavior, we
have to focus on the situation rather than personality. Personal-
ity plays a weaker role in behavior than we used to think.
Interactionism
How people behave is always jointly determined by their
personality and the situation in which they find themselves. We
cannot claim that either personality or the situation is the only
determinant of our behavior. Our behavior is an outcome of
the complex interaction between personality and situational
factors. We always have to consider personality and situation si-
multaneously. Therefore, we cannot predict and explain one’s
behavior with personality or situation alone.
NOTES
1. It should be noted, however, that this scale restricts the range of
possible responses. Although it is unlikely, one may believe that once
Person A engages in a behavior more than Person B, the subsequent
chance of A exhibiting the same behavior will be less than for B. This
scale prevents participants from expressing this belief adequately.
However, this restriction in itself does not bias the scale toward system-
atic overestimation. When lay estimates are compared with actual esti-
mates using this scale, domains other than personality traits produce
moderate accuracy for abilities such as athletics, very high accuracy for
student course evaluations, and systematic underestimation in other
instances, for example, ability estimates made by professional psychol-
ogists (Kunda & Nisbett, 1986). Moreover, this restriction does not
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interfere with cross-cultural comparisons because the same restriction
exists across cultures.
2. This finding of no cultural differences in behavioral predictions
was replicated with a sample of Chinese participants. Chinese students
from Taiwan at a large American university (n = 41), and a different
group of American university students at the same institution (n = 98),
completed a questionnaire very similar to the one used in Study 1.
Results were largely consistent to the ones reported here. No main
effect of culture was obtained, F(1, 133) < 1, and there was no culture by
behavioral information interaction, F(2, 133) < 1. There was a signifi-
cant effect of aggregation for both cultures.
3. This methodological change was necessary because it was not
meaningful to introduce strong situational constraint information
while contrasting the behavior of two actors. For a strong situational
constraint to be meaningful, it requires that individual differences be
relatively slight.
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